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INTRO DUCHON

With prospects for increasing scarcity of vital raw materials and continued
price increases for both the world's raw materials and finished products, eccnOffiic cr1ses are likely to be an increasingly frequen~ diplomatic problem for govern1111?ntal offictals in a variety of countries.· Such crises might entail acute
_and unexpected disruptions of supplies, shortages, difficulties in obtaining hard
currency, err.bargoes, and inflation or unemployment transmitted from the dea ltngs
of one country to another.

We must understand the ·way government 1eaders are

likely.to react to such crises if we hope tp improve responses and predict economic di~locations.
Several examples· of recent economic disruptions qualify as crises -- s1'nce
decision-makers, at least for a brief time, anticipated grave threat to their
economies.

The 1973-74 oil price increase and selective embargo was perhaps the
1

rudest awakening -for leaders i'n the industrialized as well as

11

Third" worlds.

Genera 11y, we know how the 1arger and more powerful countries responded to this
crisis:

the United States, according to the Church Committee and other sources,

relying greatly on private industry and the o-il c01r;panies to provide necessary
supplies, at a time of relatively low dependence on foreign oil; England and
France attempting, generally in vain, to work out special arrangerr:ents with the
Arab states in return for a friendlier diplomatic posture on the issue of the
Middle East war, and pressuring -- again unsuccessfully -- oil companies to sup,.,.

ply them fully while other countries' supplies were being cut back; Germany rely1ng on a relatively free market economy -- one of the few states in Europe not
to attempt an imposition of petroleum price ceilings durinq the crisis -- and
ending up with large quantities of petroleum products {althou0h evidently encuring some worries and the imposition of autobahn speed 1imits for the first time).

-2We know that the multi-national oil companies -- especially the seven majors
-- were instrumental in redistributing oil supplies around the world and in enforcing a system of "equal misery," in which all countries suffered to relatively
the same extent.

This world1tJidc shortage was around 13-15%; and in almost every

investiqation of oil company activity the conclusions were that the companies did
the. best they could in a difficult situation.

Nevertheless, doubts persist in

some ci rel es because of a symoiotk relationship between oil producing natfons
and oil companies in pricing policy.
Thus, while much is known atiout the responses of powerful states or groups
of states around the world, conspicuously absent is a consideration of the oil.

crists' effect on minor industrial powers, particularly those promottng a high
degree of social welfare through governrr~nt programs.
be

Such social programs could

hard-pressed by world economic dislocations and disruption of

supplies or trade.

In the future it will be important to know how these s~ates

are likely to react to economic crisis, and how hard-hit they are likely to be.
Theoretically one would expect states ruled by a Social Democratic Party, or·
which have fligli levels of government participation in economic affairs, includtng
sign,'fkant responsibility for social welfare programs, to seek firm control during a crisis situation.

One would expect Social Democrats. to be more suspicious

of ousiness than Conservative Party members during such a crisis.
Yet political and economic• traditions have much to do with crisis response,
even for Social Democratic regimes.

If a small power is economically dependent

on other major powers, it may make little difference what party is in power
;,

few viable alternatives rr.ay exist in a crisis.

The ruling party's majority in a

parliamentary system, and its length of ter.ure in office might affect that party 1.s
assertiveness and regulations.

Traditions of business-government rclaticns in

the country could have a strong impact on crisis decisions.

The size and t~J.ditional
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i'nfluence of the (:,usiness coITTrunity \,'JOuld be a factor pei,.;har;s rr:ediating against
government regulation, nationalization, or investigation.

Some Social Demo-

cratic Parties have also disassociated therr.selves from state· ownership of industry or large scale nationalization.
Competing hypotheses about rr:inor power response to economic crisis appear
plausible.

On the one hand the response could involve significant govern~ent

attempts to gain control of the situation and carefully regulate the private sector in order to prevent economic dislocation and maintain governmental suprema-cy.
This follows from the notion that states with

11

open 11 economies, i.e., those high-

ly dependent on international contacts and trade, are more subject than closed
economies (seif-sufficientl to public· sector growth in order to manage delicate
international connections.

The state asserts itself in order to reduce or ameli-

orate internationa1 vulnerabilities.

Thus; in one study the significant growth

in both tne Dutch and Swedish public sectors from 1960-75, as measured by share
of government revenues, was explained by both economies' openness and dependence
on foreign trade.

Social Democracy itself was not a sufficient explanation since

the Netherlands ranked low in Social Democratk electoral support for the government until 1973. · (Cameron, 1978, pp. 1249-55)

If this pattern of assertive pub-

lic sector management holds for crises~ we would expect an increase of governmental
regulation of the oil industry during the oil crisis of 1973-74, and an integrated
governmenta 1 program to manage energy resources.
On the other hand, minor power leaders may expect diminishing marginal returns for governmental involvement on issues over which the minor power has extremely 1ittl e internationa 1 influence. · For instance, on the issue· of petro 1eum
availability, if cartels and J\merican or British companies rr,ake rr,ost of the major
decisions, it ·may seem counter-:productive for a minor power to step up its regu- ·
lation of the oil industry.

Hence., we might .expect a laissez faire· approach~·-

. -Lt-

even from a Social Democratic government.

This may be especially so if the

national tradition is for very little regulation of petroleum suppliers and
very little governr.ient interest in contra 11 i ng or opera ting corporations.

~inor

po~ers with greater international oil connections might be expected to under;j__

take a more active response to imrr€diate crisis than less influential states if
this second hypothesis holds true.
Alternatively, vulnerability and extremely limited international influence
on a given issue could lead to attempts to satisfy do~estic electoral constituencies during crisis.

Here the importance of the international situation is

seen as less pressing because not very much can be done about it.

Instead, minor

power leaders may simply seize the opportunity to push pet programs, increasing
governmental assertiveness in ways calculated to appeal to important constituencies.

This is especially likely if elections are expected.· In such circum-

stances we would expect less 9overnment regulation during the crisis in states.
with international influence on the issue than in states without influence -where the arena of debate is perforce domestic.
little td do with "solving the crisis

11

Regulations might have very

since that may be impossible -- instead

bureal!cracies and interest groups may push for a series of relatively unrelated
regulations.
Hence, three patterns of response appear possible:

(1) government asser-

. tiveness in a concerted and coordinated attempt to remedy the crisis; (2) governlTient reliance on the private sector to solve or handle the crisis; (3)
11

11

11

11

disjointed governmental response, with a series of !5!. hoc regulations satisfy~

ing various bureaucracies or interest groups.
to det~rmine the response:

Two sets of factors appear likely

(1) traditions of privite public sector relations --

including governmental approaches to planning and regulation; (2) international
vulnera5ility and influence on the issue in question.

-5-

We shall examine each of these factors as they affected policies during the
1973 crists, beginning with planning traditions.

Swedish and Dutch

cdsis responses will be covered. -Both Sweden and Holland are very open economies,
and patterns of governmE!nt assertiveness during the crisis will be identified ac-

.

,

,

cording to the three hypotheses and related to the domestic and international environments.
TRADiTIONS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION AND PLANNING IN THE NETHERLANDS AND S\.JEDEN

Both the Netherlands and Sweden were, in 1973-74, modified social welfare
states with well developed economic planning agencies and yet only very limited
public ownership of property.
but

Social Democratic parties ruled in 5oth states,

·these parties had long eschewed serious interest in nationalization of, and

had matntained pragmatic and relatively close working relations with private
industry.

Both states have what might be called a "liberal corporatist 11 economk

approach.
In such systems, business and labor are encouraged to achieve overall settlements and guidelines for the whole nation, with sometimes direct and sometimes indirect government participation.

Thus, employer and employee confederations wield

considerable centralized power over economic conditions.

In the Netherlands these

consultations have been highly institutionalized with direct government participation and occasional willingness to help enforce. settlements.

Swedish corporat-

ism leaves more autonomy for the bargaining groups without much government participation.
.:;,,

Bargaining is centralized but not highly controlled.

(See Lehm-

bruch, 1977, pp. 95-109)
In the Netherlands the history of public sector planning is as old as the
need to hold back the sea and reclaim the land.
cn'sis ahrays faces Netherlands' leaders.

In some sense, ~n environmental

Economic crises after the First World

War also spurred planninq, and the dislocation and destruction of the Nazi' period

-6-

.

led to concerted organization for pas t-vrnr recovery.

In a country intricate 1y

connected vii th and dependent on i nternati ona 1 tr_ade markets, the Nether1 ands government is also responsible for assisting traders and transporters, and promoting
competitive prices by controlling inflation.

Business and government officials

have coordinated economic and trade policies since the Permanent Committee on
.►.

•

Trade Policy v1as created in 1891.

(Singh, 1972, p. 37)

The Dutch labor movement,

with strong ties to the Social Democrats (now Labor Party), also opted for
parti ci pati on in the Socia 1 and Economic Council, formed after \-Jorl d i,Jar II
as the government s main advisory body; labor had played a similar role in the
1

employer-employee Federation of Labor.
With this

successful institutionalization of economic interest groups, and

planning through economic advisors within the government (Central Economic Planning
Bureau, Central Bank, Central Bureau of Statistics) the Dutch Government has been
able to set economic goals for the society, and both labor and business have
participated closely.

Created under Labor-led coalition governments after the

war, the system has survived and has made the question of public ownership of
industry largely irrelevant in the Netherlands economy, at least until the late
sixties, when some leftist splinter parties or facti6ns again brought up
questions of nationalization, and when Dutch labor unions became more militant
on wage and hours issues.

(Blanken 1976, p. 36)

The North Sea gas discoveries have

led· to profitable joint government-business ventures.

But Mainstream Dutch Social

Democrats, continue to believe that the economy can be regulated effectively
through consultative machinery, legislation, and socio-economic pianning on such
questions as housing, health, transportation, public welfare, and public works.
At the vwrst moments of Nethe'rlands

I

post-war economic history--worst in the

sense of threats to foreign trade lifelines--such as immediate reconstruction
and the new inflationary pressures of the late 1950 1 s and 60 1 s, the government
resorted to ·more direct economic controls, including wage and price freezes, cuts
in expenditures, tax increases, increased rents and social insurance costs.

-7Indeed this

11

.

belt tightening 11 precipitated the departure of the Labor Party

from the Cabinet in 1958, an absence which lasted, with brief exception, until
Economic controls did not stem the wage and price inflation of the

1973.

expansive sixties; the Netherland~ were saved from serious economic problems
only by continued world economic expansion and trade which allowed somewhat
parallel increases of ~,;ages, production, and economic activity.
,.
•

p. 40)

(Blanken, 1976,

A serious petroleum or resource scarcity would threaten this precarious

balance, and could conceivably lead to the same strong governmental controls
imposed during previous economic threats.
While Dutch planning and_ regulation had a long history, the government has
also been highly influenced by business interests, and the oil industry has been
especially influential and autonomous.

Even regulatory boards designed to

oversee the energy situation are frequently headed or staffed by ex-oil company
officials.

When allocation plans were developed during the Depression the

government made it clear that this would not portend a move toward

11

permanent

Socialism. 11 The Dutch state has placed much value on private sector initiative
even in the midst of planning, and has utilized corporatist consultative
institutions to help harmonize business, labor, and government approaches.
Thus, when economic crisis again loomed in 1973, with a direct threat of
petroleum scarcity, the question was whether a Labor-dominated coalition
government would revert to traditionally stringent controls, would change the
emphasis of such controls, and/or would maintain the reliance on the private
sector (in consultation with labor and e.conomists)
The Labor Party, in office for only a few months, had not had much
ti~e to plan for crisis~ or to reshape the key governmental departments concerned
with energy and the economy, particularly the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
S\•!edish planning and governmental regulatory traditions \'Jere very similar
to those in Holland, though vlithout the· pressing, nearly constant ecological
crises facing Netherlands 1 leaders.

SvJedish Social Democrats, in pov1er (and
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coalitior.s) continuously from

'i932

to the mid-seventies, pursued gradualistic

policies to promote economic equality, the 1:1elfare state, and a ·mixed economy.
State ownership of the means of production has ~een rare in Sweden, and not a
Social Democratic priority.

(Sease, 1977, p. 43 and Lindbeck, 1974, p. 245)

The most pressing issue concerning private owner~hip ~eems to have been worker
,..,

representation in corporate decision-making, with the question of planning
.

,;

•

and utilization of resources coming next in Social" Democrv.tic priorities
regarding regulation.

(Hancock, 1976, pp. 175-76) This involved the government

in questions related to energy (e.g., mining of uranium) and led to increased
regulation, but did not particularly extend to regulation or ownership of oil
industries (except on issues such as pollution).

With no petroleum resources, the

state saw little Yole for itself in the oil business as the 1973 crisis emerged.
Lindberg (1977) notes that Sweden, as with a variety of industrialized
states--capitalistic, Socialist, and Communist--has had rather disjointed and
incremental decision-making on energy questions.

However, he notes that the

1973 crisis seemed to spur a more thorough reconsideration or these policy
shortcomingi and lack of overall planning in Sweden than elsewhere.

This is

demonstrated, for instance, in rather clearly defined publicly debated choices
on the future use of nuclear power.

Nevertheless, until 1973 the perceived

·technical nature of energy development, and complex international market
arrangements had produced a ~eliance on private corporations and a significant
penetration of corporate influence into var.ious Swedish bureaucracies dealing
with energy--a penetration similar to that in the Netherlands.
Economic planning in Sweden generally is carried on by special committees
or ·commissions issuing long term (five year) reports.
forecasts rather than directives.

Suggestions

These reports constitute

aie made for medium term public

and private sector policies after consultations between government and leaders
of these sectors.

Unlike the Netherlan.ds, where government reliance on ·planning

expertise has been extensive, Sv, edish reports are _seldom officially adopted as
1
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government policy; rather they are'used to gather information and build motivation
and confidence.

(See Lindbeck,1974, pp. 165-67)_

Government planning has not significantly restricted or directed the large
private industrial sectors of Holland and Sweden.

Instead, both states utilize

versions of ·semi-corporatist government-labor-industry consultation in setting
11

11

wage and price levels.

However, resources have increasingly been transferred

from private to public sectors through taxation and reallocation in government
programs.
Both countries had histories of crisis pfanning bureaucracies stemming from
the Depression era or WWII.

In Sweden's case, planning had worked quite well

during the Second World War and 1956 supply ·interruptions, and was viewed as one
of the main underpinnings of successful neutrality in world politics.

A Committee

on Economic Defense had been previously established and bore significant
responsibility for planning allocations in crisis.
I

This Committee always fu-nctioned,

and in peacetime was responsible for stockpiling important goods for possible
wartime use.

When crisis
11

11

emerged, it was clear that this Committee should be

in charge, and that other organizat,ons could be set up under its authori~y.

The

Fuel Board (see Figure 1) was the main subordinate agency for the petroleum
crises, and directly responsible to and highly influential with the Government.
Holland also had regulatory boards in past crises (even under Conservative
governments), with such boards deciding the allocation of textiles, pharmaceuticals,
and raw materials as well as food during the Secona World War and Depression years.

.

There was also an Office of Economi.c Defense within the Dutch Economics Ministry

_

~

which operated in much the same way as the Swedish Committee; NATO responsibilities
made strategic resource planning i~perative.
Despite significant government regulation of and intervention in the respective
economies, both countries remained predominanatly capitalistic.
94~~ of S\vedish industry was privately owned.

Approximately

(Hedlund and Otterbeck, 1977, p. 16).

\•Jhile some important Netherlands industries, notably the transportation (as in
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Sv1eden) and natural gas works, v1ere nationalized, 'the vast bulk of Netherlands
industry \'/as also in private hands.

The discovery of natural gas deposits

presented a clear opportunity for a rare excursion by the Dutch government into
part ownership--through franchises and joint ventures--in an ~nergy related
industry.
Thus both Sweden and Holland are modified welfare states, with the governmental role some\•that limited to the social and regulatory spheres, and rarely
extended to the area of ovmership and business decision-making.

Governments in

both states participate in labor negotiations, and hence have significant
impact -0n decisions.

Both Sweden and Holland have traditions of diplomatic

neutrality which required crisis preparedness and planning, but neither state
evolved rigorously eaforced peace-time general economic or developmental plans
familiar in Socialist states.

Both states are significantly involved in more

specific land use, population, housing, and education planning, as well.

Agencies

produce long term "plans," for overall economic activity, but these are generally
guides for monetary and fiscal policy.
CONTRASTING, YET SIMILAR INTERNATIONAL CRISIS ENVIRONMENTS
Immediate environments in late 1973 for Nethetlands and Swedish leaders were
quite different.

The Netherlands was officially boycotted by Arab states in

October, ostensibly because ef support for Israel by leading members of the Labor
Party Government, but in the minds of many Netherlanders because of the strategic
importance of the port of Rotterdam.

In addition, the Netherlands belonged to

both the European Economic Community· (EEC) and the NATO a11 i ance, and had an
interest in at least one major world oil company - Shell Oil.

T~e Netherlands

enjoyed significant deposits of natural gas, which was exported to other
Europe?rn countries as well.

The Labor-Cea l iti on Government, the first since 1958,

with a brief exception in 1965-66, enjoyed a viable working coalition with
sma 11 er progressive parti-es, as well -as with the .1 arge Catholic ,Party( in a sense Hollc1nd was not under the full influence of "Social D_emocracy").

Fina,lly, the

-11-

Dutch tended to support Israel, both because of lingering guilt over the fate
of Dutch Jev1s during the Naz·i occupation, and strategic NATO calculations
emphasizing Israel 1 s importance in the Middle East.

(Heldring, 1974)

Yet,

the~e was also a slow evolution in Dutch Mid-Eastern policy, in line with growing
sympathies for 11 Third viorld 11 movements and oil interests.

(Schaper, 1975)

By contrast, Sweden, while economically and soci~lly quite similar to
;

the Netherlands, faced quite different gee-political pressures.

Sweden maintained

diplomatic neutrality and was not a member of the European Community.

v/hile

Swedes organized and owned significant multi-national enterprises - including
SKF (ballbearing and steel producer), L. M. Ericsson (telephones and electronics),
Electrolux, Swedish match, Sandvik (steel), Alpha-Laval (machinery), Atlas Copco

(machinery), and AGA (gas, welding, electronics) - nothing matched the scope and importanc
in the oil crisis of Shell.

Swedish industry may have been. the 11 most multinational

in the vwrld 11 (L indbecn, 1974, p. 162) but, Sweden was not as influential in
international business circles - particularly those related to petroleum - as
were the Dutch.
Sweden had no significant naturak,qas
resources, although there was consider-· .
able mining (uranium) and forestry potential in the energy area.

In fact, major

foreign oil companies had a near total domination of the Swedish market, as
domestic companies had only about a 10% share, with their oil mostly bought on
the international spot market.

(Dagens Nvheter, November 24, 1973, p. l ) While

the Netherlands had a significant petroleum refinery operation in Rotterdam,
Sweden refined only 40% of its petroleum consumption.
imported from that Rotterdam facility.

The rest was mainly

Shell and British Petroleum combined

for a 32.4% share of the Swedish market, with Exxon, Mobil, Gulf, and Texaco
accounting for another 27.6%.
market share.

The consun1er owned national OK Company had a 13%

(Commission on Energy Emergency Preparedness, SOU, 1975: 60,

p. 72; Svenska Daqbladet, December 12, 1973, enclosure p. XI)•
Social Democracy preva i1 cd in Sweden, and had done so s i nee before the .Second

-12World War, leaving a much firnier tradition and influence on the bureaucracy
for the Social Democratic Party than in Holland .. Hov,ever, the September 1973
gene~al election had resulted in an even split between Socialists and the
non-Soc·ialists.

The Social Democrats remained in pov1er, but now without a

majority of their own.

This resulted in something of ·a

11

lottery-parliament/ 1

since a number of questions were decided by drawing lots in the case of tie
votes.

Thus, nevi Swedish elections appeared imminent, and it seemed that the

handling of the energy crisis could not help but be an election issue.
Despite strong public preferences for Israel in both countries in 1973-and a staunch determination to shov, the Arabs that the societies could survive
without their oil, Sweden's image in the Arab world was more favorable than
Holland's-though Dutch enterprises continued 11 business as usual 11 with Arab
customers throughout the boycott.

The Swedes had championed Third World rights

during the l960's and early 70's, but perhaps more importantly, there was no
major "Europort" in SvJeden and no Arab diplomat as forceful as those representing
Kuwait and other states in the Hague.

The French,and Italians--because of EEC

frictions vlith Holland, had relayed word of.Dutch leaders' pro-Israeli positions
to the Arabs, as had Arab diplomats.

Sweden's more neutral and remote European

role may have spared her such notoriety and pressure.

(See Pearson, 1979)

·vet while there were significant dissimilarities in the situations confronted
by the two states, there were a great many similarities as well.

World petroleum

price increases would affect both of these'highly industrial and yet significantly
agricultural economies.

While Sweden did not belong to the European Community,

it did have significant trade with members of that group, particularly with
Germany.

Sv,eden was directly dependent on the Rotterdam spot and refinery markets,

as well as on multinational oil companies which dealt through Rotterdam.
Awv.re of the planning traditions, emphasis on private enterprise, and trade
dependence of these two states, \ve can consider their crisis responses~: JJy_pothesJs·_,·,>-,~
one posited a concerted integrated government response to crisis; hypothes.is,Jwo,a,_, ___ ,.,_ -·

-13laissz-fai_re_ approach; and hypothesis three a disjointed response premised
largely on domestic political pressure.

If the second pattern prevails, we

might expect a more active Dutch than Swedish government response to the crisis,
since the Netherlands had greater international petroleum influence.

If the

third pattern prevailed, we would expect more regulation-albeit disjointed-in
Sweden due to domestic pressure and negligible intern~tional influence.

If

both governments react \·iith integrated and ambitious energy availability and
consumption plans and controls, responses typical of the first hypothesis, it
would indicatethatpublic sector grm1th--conditioned by open economics--would be
expected in minor power~ crisis as well as non-crisis periods.
The Netherlands Reaction to Crisis
The initial Dutch response to potential oil shortage, real price increases,
and an unexpected embargo in October of 1973 was rather confused.

The first

month of the crisis was spent in bureaucratic attempts to devise a rational policy
tov,ards the Middle East - mainly the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, and
in nearly total reliance by the Economics Ministry on information and distribution
through oil companies, especially Shell. The Economics Ministry was the focus
of decision-making to cushion the i.mpacts of petroleum scarcity.

Heavy pressure

was applied by other European states, notably Germany, England, and France, for
a change in the Netherlands' strongly pro-Israeli stand.

At the same time, in

the economic sphere, the Government .requested EEC assistance and resource sharing
if petroleum shortages reached dire proportions.

Within one month the Dutch

modified their Middle Eastern political position, with the direct participation of the
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, to subscribe to EEC policies.

(See Pearson,

197 9)

At first, the threat of embargo did not seem serious, since it was not even
clear which Arab states - if any - had officially established such an embargo.
This was clarified in November, when real fears began to emerge in the Hague that
tankers already at sea would arrive at port and that no new tankers would be

-14anu:ed to set sail for Rotterdam.

t·!hile it v-1as immediately clear that Shell

and other companies v1hich had heavily invested in the Rotterdam refinery complex
would be reluctant to leave the Netherlands dry of petroleum, it was not clear
how much production would be reduced, affecting employment in'Rotterdam, exportsof finished products from Rotterdcm, and the availability of petroleum for the
Netherlands domestic market.
,;

•-

Companies had their own supply contracts to meet

throughout Europe, and in Germany, with uncontrolled prices, the market was
e~pecially attr~ctive.
On the asset side, however, the Netherlands was only about 50% dependent on
petroleum for fuel in 1972, the second lowest figure in the European Community;
Netherland~ natural gas deposits represented a domestic resource of ·great value,
as well as an export lever and money-maker.

Nevertheless, economists calculated

that a 20% reduction of production in the petrochemical and refining industries
would result in about 25,000 more persons ~hemployed in the region.

(Lesuis and

Muller as quoted by Rosenthal and Scholten, 197~)
The Economics Ministry :~esponded only incrementally because of the surprise
of the threat and because of recent governmental changes.

In particular, the

Netherlands had just experienced a prolonged cabinet crisis, dating from 1972~
and a transition to a Labor Government.

As noted by Professor Heldring, the Labor

Party had moved markedly to the left, with a new generation, a Vietnam influenced
11

11

generation of leaders.

These leaders had ambitious plans for expanded governmental

roles in social planning, economic control, equalization of economic opportunity,
~

.

/

and redefinition of foreign policy with less acceptance of NATO and EEC cl,ches.
(Heldring, 1974) · It was not clear what effect this would have on the Econbmics
Ministry, on the direction of policy regarding regulation of companies, or in
the overall direction of the econon~.
In a remarkably short time the Ministry of Economic Affairs developed a
se~ies of rules ~nd regulations to handle the crisis and reduce both petroleum
iniports and export~

by

controlling consumption. These included measures announced

-15on October 22: carless Sundays, reactivation of the Resource Distribution A~t
of 1939 (a product of war-time conditions, providing for the control of production
and distribution of key resources), establishment of the State Office for Oil
Products, and in November, the la~nching of plans for gasoline rationing.
(Rosenthal and Schotlen, 1976)
The Office for Oil Products was staffed mainly from Economics Ministry civil
servants and employees
company official.

11

loaned 11 by oil companies, and headed by a former oil

Oil company participation on such regulatory boards had been

common in the Netherlands in the post-war period.

The enabling legislation

provided that this Office would execute the rationing of petroleum and petroleum
products.

Rosenthal and Scholten point out that:
. To some extent the emergency measures taken were prepared
long in advance. ~Jithin the Department of Economic Affairs
there is a sma 11 permanent Office of Economic Defense
Planning, charged with the preparation and the updating
of energy measures for wartime conditions ac~ording to
NATO and national plans and including ·r0.tioning. In this
context oil-companies had to keep stock for at lease sixty
days and coupons for gasoline rationing had been printed
in advance. (1976, p. 5)

The main threat of shortage had already passed in January when rationing was
finally introduced; it was introduced mainly for bureaucratic reasons-under the
pressure of the Transport Ministry.
· By December the Netherlands Government had formulated its plan o~ action,
which included enabling legislation. fitting Labor Party and coalition cabinet
priorities for control of prices, rents, and wages.

to the dismay of unions - ~ven

The enabling bill was introduced and passed by Parliament in December,

in an atmosphere of crisis with little discussion of indications that Arab oil
pr6duction cutbacks were already easing.

One of the bill 1s themes was the

redistribution of incomes and protection of employment, with the Minister of
Social Affairs, who had concern for Labor, allowed to make rules for one year
on these issues.

The figures quoted in• Parliament at the time \<Jere that in the

absence .of strong 1neasures for energy conservation, national production would
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decrease by 10% and unemployment would rise to more than 200,000 people.
(Parliamentary reports cited by Rosenthal and Scholten, 1976, p. 5).

Crude

oil imports to Rotterdam did decrease considerably in December compared to
prior months, but recovered quick1y with new oil shipments and reductions of
both consumption and certain exports.
Oil companies v1ere traditionally very influential in the Netherlands,
enjoying important connections with the Directorate General For Energy Production
in the Economics Ministry.
servants

11

Representatives of business interests and civil

collaborated frequently in - among others - advisory councils like the

Electricity Board, the Industrial Board For Nuclear Energy, and the Coal Board!'
(Rosenthal and Schotlen; 1976, p. 7)

This may be typical of a 11 distributive 11

type of decision-making, with a low degree of ideology or conflict, committee
politics or _party discipline; rather,
11

A technocratic atmosphere dominates the ~rena. There is
plenty of room to incrementally satisfy the different group
(sic.) involved. 11
Politicians \'1ere not included in the information network on energy resources,
with the energy situation referred mainly to 11 a small group of 1 experts 1 within
the different party-political groups in Parliament. 11
1976, p. 7)

(Rosenthal and Schotlen,

The gas fields had produced a lucrative relationship between govern-

ment· and business in that profits were distributed and shared through a franchi~ing
system; and it must be recognized that the Netherlands interest in opposing the
Arab petroleum price increase was partially tempered by the fact that Parliament
had authorized natural gas prices to increase,with a one year lag, on the basis of
petroleum price increases.

The Dutch Government had begun to assert a greater

cla.im to direct participation in oil company exploration in the late sixties and
early seventies when North Sea drilling was expanded, but this assertiveness
did not extend-to petrol~um, as opposed to gas, production.
Rdsenthal and Scholten note that with the crisis atmosphere and at least
temporary belief in- a possible shortage, this comfortable 11 distributive 11

-17arrangement almost became \•ihat may be called a redistributive one.
11

11

Here,

there was more conflict, more open debate, more conflicting class interest, and
more politicization.

While scme parliamentarians - even in the left wing of the

Labor Party, criticized the companies and joined the unions in open speculation
about deception, the Economic Ministry debated the direction_ to take in dealing
with the companies in the future.

One influential leader in the Ministry

believed that the companies would pull the Netherlands through in this and
future crises, and that countries like France were foolish to nationalize and
seek direct control.

Companies kne\'1 best how to handle the intricacies of the

international oil market.

(Personal interview, The Hague, 1977)

But perhaps under the impetus of the new government, this official was
gradually bypassed in authority during the crisis within the Ministry.

Instead,

younger officials began to emphasize a more comprehensive set of plans for controlling the economy and for gathering more information on the availability of oil
resources.

Nevertheless, they too were willing to rely on the companies for

ultimate petroleum distribution, since there was little choice and no great support
for nationalization.

The benefits of Rotterdam were too apparent ahd the dangers

of competition from other European ports too pressing for any stern measures to
regulate or control companies.

Investments, after all, could be moved else-

where in the long run if neccessary, and the Netherlands is a small country unable
to control the multi-nationals from which it benefits.*
A Dutch official also happened to chair the OECD Petroleum Committee, which

*Let us not forget that even Shell's main headquarters are in the United
Kingdom.

->·~
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met in December after the OECD as a v/hole had failed to declare the state of
emergency v1hich vJOuld have provided oil sharing for the Netherlands and other
embargoed states.

The Committee was designated as a place \'/here the United

States, the Netherlands, Britain, and other oil powers would supervise and
facilitate company arrangements to ease the crisis.

This amounted essentially

to a series of meetings in which the Netherlands official merely gave a stamp
of approval to company sharing arr::;r.gements and collaboration to S\.'Jitch oil and
supply certain countries. · These arrangements have been criticized by such
observers as Peter Odell of Erasmus University, who points out that one effect
was to parcel out among certain companies nearly exclusive access to separate
European markets.

Others note that the United States was also abl·e to catch

up with Europe economically when European production prices rose because of
high depende~ce on imported oil. The Netherlands would not be as subject to
such price increases as France or other more dependent countries.

Indeed, the

U.S. and the Nether1ands worked quite closely in the economic arena at this time,
with the Economics Ministry at one point petitioning the U.S. Justice Department
on behalf of an American oil company doing business in Holland, to ease anti-trust
enforcement along the lines suggested by Secretary of State Kissinger, so that
the companies might more easily collaborate.*
The Dutch Government moved toward more overall economic control, and used
the crisis to justify restrictive measures which might tone down consumption.
This fit the domestic priorities of the Labor Party,formulated prior to the crisis.
While consumption restrictions ~et the uncertainties of crude oil supply in
December, Holland 1 s overall energy supply remained mar~ than adequate.

The

government did not publicize the fact that refined oil product imports--especially
from Britain in January, 1974 (much to the displeasure of the British Government)
*Despite this cooperation, Tourma Ari da, in commenting on the oil situation,
has noted that the U.S. government counselled the Saudi Arabians to keep Holland
on the embargoed 1ist long after the U.S. was removed, perhaps to continue the
pressur·e on [urope or to resist France d1ich v1as by that tin:e calling for removal
of the Ara~Netherlands embargo--desiring Algerian access to EEC.
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increased to offset declining crude oil deliveries.
Thus, the Dutch Government seized the or,portunity to push through pol i ti ca lly
controversial legislation entailing ~olicies which did not quite mesh with the
actual supply picture.

(See Pearson, 1979

5

p. 129)

Even these control and con-

servation efforts were· short-liv~d, spanning the time from the Prime Minister's
December l television speech, in which he promfsed that pre-crisis good days would
f

never return, to the mid-February statement by the Minister of Finance that the
shortage of oil was hardly the most pressing economic ptoblem anymore.

Meanwhile,

the Economics Ministry seemed to move along with business as usual in its symbiotic
relations with the oil companies.

The Ministry also exerted a greater role in

demanding a 11 take 11 of the gas revenues to make up for its concession in.allowing
higher oil prices.

In September, 1974 it was announced that government revenues from

gis could reach as high as 95%.

This would allow the Cabinet to continue its social

programs and take advantage of at least the·short-term gas bonanza.

In addition,

the Cabinet made good use of gas resources in bringing France to a less conflictive
position on EEC resource sharing, through thinly veiled threats of a natural gas cut
off. (LeMonde, Nov. 19, 1973)
Thus, the Economics Ministry adopted a more assertive economic role, but it
did not affect the traditionally lucrative relations the Ministry had already
established.*
*The reality of continued close relations between the oil companies and the
Netherlands government is illu~trated. in certain price and profit figures. Despite·
formal price ceilings, price of refined gasoline in the Netherlands was the second
highest among the six major EEC countries, second only to Germany. In addition, in
December, 1973 average profit margins on the sale of oil product~ in the Netherlands
were con~iderably higher than in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom (where there
was a loss in sales). (Prodi and Clo, 1975, p. 99) The Netherlands, along with other
European exporting countries, imposed export licenses and controls to try and limit
the shqrtage of oil products. Nevertheless, Prodi and Clo point out that as with
most European governments, the Netherlands did not attempt or was not able to keep
up on the current supply situation - talking about scarcity and yet ~vitnessin9 a
developing surplus of oil in European stora9e. Also, as with oth~r European countri~s,
in the absence of clear information· on price and demand elast:icity_in the oil mar'ket,
the government chose to regu 1ate pi·iva te consumrti on and spare· i ndustri-a l ·users. This
could have ste1:11:ied both fro1i1 business influr~nce in government. and concern about
potentially disastrous unemployment levels.
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--The Netherlands form of Social Democracy is a: very pragmatic one.

The

Dutch government had been criticized publicly for what was considered too meek
a natural·gas policy. in the pre-crisis days; the crisis provided an opportunity
for the Economics Ministry to assert a tougher policy which would link large
quantity gas prices, i.e. export prices, to crude oil prices in the world market.
As vi ev:ed by some other EEC states, the Dutch. Government--the "voice of Shell 11-al so controlled compani~s• licenses to export to the lucrative German·markei,
control over the profitable "spot market."

Nevertherless, as Scholten and Rosenthal

(1976) point out, Rotterdam remained largely dependent on oil (and not gas), and
there was a significant temporary increase in unemployment during the production
cutbacks in late 1973 and early 1974.

i~hile the government could afford to pay

relief and subsidize this work-loss through natural gas revenues, the economy
was vulnerable to oil price and supply problems.
Generally, the Dutch Government sought somewhat greater economic control
during the crisis, but was careful to defer to oil company expertise.

The

response most closely corresponds to hypothesis 3--i.e., disjointed government
policies designed mainly in response to bureaucratic and interest group pressure.
This does not mean that the policy was not well conceived or rational; it made
sense for the Dutch to rely on their oil company connections.

Indeed, intra-and

inter-ministerial Committees-met to develop a coordinated crisis response.
However, segments of the bureaucracy (the Foreign Ministry) did not want to be
intimately informed of what other segments were doing (e.g.-coordinating with oil
companies) because it would be diplomatically embarrassing in relations with Arab.
states.

(Personal interviews, Netherland Foreign Ministry, The ~ague, March, 1977)

The Dutch Government was not very assertive in guarding against company collusion-and ev~n presided over inter-company discussions.

Policies, such as rationing, were

implemented long after the acute need had passed--for example, to follow through
with prior planning by the Transport Ministry.

The public 1tJas not provided \vith

much clear information on supply, as the Goverrnrn~nt seized an orportunity to

-21push emergency control legislation through Parliament.

there was an integrated control policy, i.

~

In a sense, then,

hypothesis one, but it left the

companies relatively free, and it was less suited to the developing supply
picture than to previously developed Labor Party priorities, Jo company
initiatives, and to separate bureaucratic demands.
The Swedish Response
~

At least one Dutch.bureaucrat has noted that a summit meeting took place
during the oil crisis in which Prime Minister Palme of Sweden told Prime Minister
Den Uyl of the Netherlands that they shared some of the same problems.

This

evidently meant the problem of changing consumption patterns and lifestyles in
an energy scarce situation, or one in which energy appeared scarce.
not this exchange took place, clear ·

Whether or

parallels between

Dutch and Swedish responses exist, despite considerable differences in the two ·
countries I p redi cam~nts;
Sweden, of course, was not singled out -for ahy special embargo, but was
subject to projected' world petroleum scarcity and higher prices.

The major world

oil companies almost completely dominated the $wedish market, with much of the
oil coming from Rotterdam, and hence coming at a much higher price during the
crisis.

As in Holland, the Social Democratic Government turned to the compani~s

to manage the supply situation during the fall

of 1973.

The Swedish

Committee on Economic Defense, however, reacted even more quickly than the Dutch
Oil Control Committee by preparing for the rationing of oil products as early as
October 15, in conjunction with the Departments of Trade,'lndustry, Justice,
Communication.

(SOU, 1975; 61, p. 602.)

Crisis economic planning had a long

history in Sweden as well as Holland, and Sweden's continuing neutrality made it
even more likely that governmental planning machinery would be_ employed quickly
during the 1973 crisis.
Hovi ever,

the oi 1 crisis was somev-,hat unusual, a peace-time crisis for which

there was no adequJte preparation by the Swedish Government.

The war analogy did

-22not work well in a ~ituation where infcirmation about threat was totally controlled
by private enterprises.

The government v1as s0111ev1hat boxed-in; a state-of-v1ar

decl~ratioh would have been inappropriate.

While Sweden began planning processes

even before the Netherlands{ and ~ventually developed a rationing plah similar to
Holland's, as in the Netherlands the ultimate management of the crisis had to be
left, at least initially, to the entities with control over supply and informatidn,
i.e., the oil companies.
As in Holland, the Swedish Government's main activities concerned control
of the economy and social welfare system, issues for which information and
direct levers of control were available.

The issue of nationalization of oil

companies was moot, after abortive moves in that direction by the Social Democratic
Government just after World War II.

Government regulation of petroleum had come

merely to mean requiring reserve stockpiles.

(Lonnroth, 1977, p.• 257.)

government role increased with the crisis, however.

The

After the initial rationing

plans were set in October, one of the next steps was to allocate 4.2-million Kronor
for an energy savings campaign in mid-November.

At the same time," the government

asked Parliament's permission to invoke rationing la\.,rs for fuels and electricity.
Exports of oil products were licensed, as in the Netherlands, though with far
less effect on company operations.

(SOU, 1975:

61, p. 605 ) The government

encouraged study groups to debate energy--and especially nuclear--issues throughout
the society (1% participation-) through adult education associations.

Parliament

and political parties then took up these. qu·estions. (Lo.nnroth., 1977, p. 258)

The

extent of and attention paid to this debate was unique among industrial countries.
The companies voluntarily began to report on their crude and refined oil
product deliveries in October (SOU, 1975:

61, p. 603), perhaps because earlier

in the month the Government had decided on price ceilings for all oil products.
This meunt, as in Holland, that companies had to apply for price increases one
month before the increase could take place.

Only one such notification was made,

and prices were raised on November 13. The "advanced notification" system \'Jas
*The Dutch Labor Party had intended to gain greater control of the econon~ even

-23replaced on December 6 by a more stringent set of direct governmental
regulations and price ceilings, with the first ceiling set on December 23.

The

Government--now asserting a more direct role--allowed another increase on January 30,
and imposed a special

11

clearing tax 11 (in effect until May, 1974) to even out the

costs of purchases by small independents vs. large major companies.

The Board

of Prices and Cartels had--irr approving the November price increases-also decided
that some independents could raise prices as much as they liked, in order to pay
for oil on the spot market.

Thus, the Swedish Government, like most others in

Europe, did not initially attempt to stem the tide toward higher prices.

Rather,

it insisted on more information, an official regulatory role, and some equity
among companies.
The government also dealt directly with the oil companies and struck an
arrangement by which the companies would cut their deliveries to buyers by 25%.
This amounted to de facto rationing even before the official coupons were issued.
As in Holland, oil company staff members were appointed to regulatory roles as
11

civil servants of regulation. 11

(SOU, 1975:

61, p. 605) Despite the earHer start

in planning, the implementation of rationing took place about the same time as in
Holland, with a December declaration

by

the Government that rationing would

begin on January 8, 1974, and with ration cards distributed to all car 01,1,ners.
· Boards and committees for handling the 1973 crisis were established in the·
Swedish administrative tradition (S~e Lindberg, l977bfl. 376), including a
Board of Agriculture, Board of Fuels, Board of Transport and Committee for
I

Rationing of Electricity, as well as the overall Board of Economic Defense.

The

Boards of Transport and Agriculture worked closely with province and county
cou·ncils as well, handing down directives.

The Fuel Board vrnrked directly with

the oil companies and took reports of company import figures.
decided on allocations to consumers.
regulation from these boards.

The Board than

Local and regional governments also received

The net ·result

1,1✓ as

that c:ompanies were directed

as to hm'I much oil consumers would rece·ive based on the previous year's consumption.

-24The Government neither bought more oil for its ovm purposes nor licensed the
companies.

NovJ,

directives v1ere issued ,v1hereas earlier in the autumn, voluntary·

agre~ments were reached to limit supplies.

The Dutch Government never attempted

quite as directly to control petroleum allocations.

Perhaps because of the

more direct government role, Swedish unemployment stayed at a remarkably low 2%,
economic growth remained high, and concomitantly energy demand continued
growing

~

(Lindberg, 1977, pp; 368-69)

The Swedish Petroleum Institute (S.P.I.), a company cooperative organization
including both majors and independents, worked wit~ both the Fuels Board and
Committee on Economic Defense in an "ombudsman" capacity.

If deliveries ran

short for certain companies, the Institute helped customers find alternate sources,
and allowed companies to collaborate more closely.

Through such consultat~on,

companies responded to government calls for supply limits.

The Government decided

not to allow price increases in the initial crisis stage (October), and this
meant that major companies refused to take on new customers, while domestic
companies already had difficulty supplying old customers.

To restify this

situation, the S.P.I. set up its own distribution system, with a

2ms

reduced

supply to be maintained for all customers and companies; petroleum would at
least remain available for all.
·This rather complex regulatory organization did not begin work until January 8,
as part of the overall allocation plan; it was at this point that the oil companies
were finally relieved of the allocation.ta~k inside Sweden.

Nevertheless, both

before and after January 8 the Government tried to restrict consumption where
possible.

The Government responded to the political opportunity to gain greater

control of the economy and moved

further than in the Netherlands to control

the allocation of fuel within the country.

This might have been expected in an

econ6mic system traditionally characterized through the trade union-social
Democratic alliance by government

11

inte·rvention on behalf of majority interests

(workers and consumers) in which political power could be used to counterbalance
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the economic power of business.II (Lindberg, l977b;p. 375, quoting Martin, 1975)
Hov1ever, differences between Dutch and Sv,edish energy regulations in 1973 were
only marginal, and the whole organization only functioned for approximately one
month, ceasing in the middle of February.
The fuel shortage in Sweden was no greater than in other European countries
and certainly no greater than in the Netherlands.

.·'

Despite the 20% rationing at

times, the net effect on Sweden during the vii nter of 1973-7 4 was a decrease in
crude oil imports of only 6%, compared with the vtinter of 1972-73 and compared to
Holland's decrease of approximately 13%.

Overall supplies of petroleum were down

.by 5%, including an increase of 13% in diesel oil and decrease of 10% for heavy
oils.

(Swedish Petroleum Instttute, 1973-74, p. 6.) A mild winter, compared to the

previous

one, may have. mediated the effects of the oil crisis somewhat.

Much

of the decline can be attributed to government-company supply reduction agreements,
which spread the supply more evenly and avoided delivery failures.

Initial re1iance

on the oi 1 companies resulted in a satisfactory, though somewhat diminished supp.ly
of petroleum products, (consumption also diminished temporarily) and at somewhat
increased prices despite formal controls.
We have seen that Netherlands' rationing was largely unnecessary by the time it
was implemented; it was implemented mainly for bureaucratic reasons as well as in
a political effort by a new government to assert control over consumption.
of the same political factors operated in the Swedish case as well.

Many

In particular,

the September 1973 general parliamentary election had resulted in an even split
between Socialists and non-Soci'alists.
shortly.

Therefore, new elections were expected

The first public opinion polls after the September election showed a shift

in opinion against the Govern~ent, which raised pressure on the Government to act
decisively.

(Svenska Oaqbladet, December 13, 1973, p. l)*

*During the energy cr1s1s the government failed to increase confidence among
the public, v1ith surveys in December and February sho1r1ing that confidence ir
politiciar~s• h2ndli119 of the crisis hi1d (Jone dovm from t15.97.'. to 37.87:. (The
Sv,edish Broudcasting Corporation Public and Program Research (PUU), "Svenskarna
.Och Oljeki-isen," p. 27.)

-26Thus, at least part of the rationing plan was· implemented for psychological
and political reasons.

The Swedish Minister of Trade declared that while petroleum

rationing vrns unnecessary from a supply standpoint:

11

It is simply like this, that

Sven~son, who does not own a car, gets lightning mad when he sits freezing in his
home and sees Andersson driving his car as usu a1 . . . 11
:

1973, p. 6.)

(

Expressen, November 11 ,

In this sense the Government m~sjudged ~he political mood; it was

not Svensson who beca.~e angry, but Andersson the motorist.
v,1as perceived as unjust and unnecessarily bureaucratic.

The rationing system

(PUB, 94/73, a, p. 30.)

The Government tried to capture and lead the political mdod, bringing about
greater fuel conservation; but the information the press pro~ided to the general
public dtd not support the Government 1 s contentions.

Crisis 1 dangers were reported

for Sweden mostly in the Autumn, and this was the period when the Government let
the oil companies do the rationing.

By January, however, as in Holland press reports had

changed, and the public was being told that better times lay ahead, that the supply
situation was improving; in the meantime, the Government initiated the rationing
organization and bureaucratic apparatus.

(SOU, 1975:

61, p. 411.)

The Minister

of Trade, Mr. Kjell Olaf Feldf, stated in a T.V. debate in the last part of November
that there was no need for saving energy at that time.
30, 1973.)

( 11 Kva1lsoppet, 11 November

Six days later, on December 6, the government and the Board of

Economic Defense started the nationwide energy savings campaign.

(The radio

news program, 11 Dagens Eko, 11 December 12, 1973 )
While the government obviously initially trusted the companies in managing
the distribution of supplies, by the beginning of 1974 public opin1on about the
compinies had become more critical and information began showing up which indicated
the companies themselves may have helped create the shortage in order to raise
their profits.

Even if this information was later shown to be false or unverifiable,

it created enough negative opinion that the Government saw the possibility, or
necessity, of turning against the companies; being careful not to attack the
S\<.Jedish subsidiaries, but only the multinational majors.

(SOU, 1975:

61, p. 461;

-27PUB, p. 25; Daqens Nyheter, November zg, 1973, ~- 29 )
The Minister of Trade charged that companies 1 profits decided their distribution policy during the crisis.

(Arbetet, October 10, 1974.) This charge was

not substantiated by the findings of the public investigation carried on after
the crisis. (SOU,1975,p. 461JDuring the crisis some in the Social Democratic
Party favored the nationalization

1

0

f all oil companies operating in Sv,eden, and

when public opinion turned against the companies at the end of the crisis, the
political climate for such an approach became better.

(Aftonbladet, December 13,

1973, p. 1 ) Trade unions demanded governmental control over the petroleum
industry, and since a nev, election seemed to be looming during the winter of 1974,
the Government would find it difficult to go· against such a powerful faction of
the Social Democratic Party.

The Cabinet already had clashed with the Tenants

Organization over the issue of the hot water rationing.
If petroleum prices had been allowed to float freely as in Germany, Swedish
companies probably would have bought on the open market and there would have been
few signs of petroleum shortage in Sweden during the crisis.

However, of course,

the lid on prices cushioned, at least temporarily, the blow of the fantastic price.
increases on the spot market.
A final conclusion must be that the political situation in Sweden conditioned
much of the crisis reaction.

The shortage existed, but it is doubtful that this

alone would have created a crisis situation.

The Government saw the opportunity

to create a strong position for itself during the crisis, perhaps with eyes on
*The Dutch government had_also clashed with elements of the Labor Party
coalition in pushing through \'/age control legislation, but had not become very
critical of the oil companies despite the pressure of influential trade unions
in Holland. This may have been partly the result of a Labor-Catholic coalition
government in the Netherlands in which the more radical Laborites were not
given economically influential ministries.
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the oncoming election.
this image.

As in Holland, the media was used extensively to project

For the first time ~ince the war, a Swedish Prime Minister took time

on national television to speak to the nation (December 19, 1973).

Just two

week~ earlier, the Dutch Prime Minister had made a memorable address in a similar
vein.
Perhaps because of general confusion or national cohesion, the opposition in
;,'

the Swedish Parliament kept remarkably and unusually quiet during the crisis,
reflecting a mood of national emergency.

Opposition later increased to the point

where a public investigation vrns authorized to examine the country s preparedness
1

for crises of this kind.
Unexpectedly, no new election was held until the regular election of 1977,
which non-Socialists won for the first time in forty-four years.
that

1i ngeri ng memories of the 1973 oil crisis

~ ~

It is doubtful

affected this outcome;

nuclear controversies stemming from 1973 as-well as economic and bureaucratic
conditions in 1976 1ed to the disenchantment.
Sweden•~ leaders acted earlier then the Dutch leaders to plan for decreased
energy consumption, and ultimately adopted a more comprehensive set of controls
during the crisis.

The response seems to fit expectations posed in hypothesis

one, except for the evident influence of domestic electoral calculations.

As in

Holland, the implementation o"f controls seemed somewhat inappropriate to the supply
situation.

Of course, in both countries controls were eased in less than a month

as petroleum supplies remained relatively plentiful.

But the degree to which the

Swedish Government began to criticize the multinational majors, as public opinion
also moved in that direction, indicates a response also typical of hypothesis

.

three; having little control over or influence with major oil con1panies it was
easier-for the Swedish Government than the Dutch to please domestic constituencies
and attack them. Still, the overall Swedish policy shielded the consumer somewh~t
from_ supply dislorations and immed_iate precipitous priee rises.

This eonstitutes-

public sector response to international vulnerability, as predi~ted in hypothesis

-29one.

Furthermore, Sweden maintained and developed more public airing of energy

policy controversies than did Holland.

This difference fits the political-economic

traditions of the two countries, with Dutch connecti'ons in the oil business and
with Sv1edi sh tendencies to open bureaucracies to scrutiny (e.g., ombudsmen, roya 1
commissions, anti-secrecy legislation, referenda and debat~ (see Lindberg, 1977, p. 376)
Thus, even in perceived economic crises, traditional administrative patterns

•
i

..

will be strongly in evidence.

-30CONCLUSIONS:
We have s~en that two Northern European industrialized states, with well
developed governmental social service sectors, had somewhat similar responses
to the energy shortage of 1973-74, despite different political and environmental
circumstances~ Both states showed scmewhat confus~d initial responses, relying
heavily 6n ~ell-established industrial connections to provide needed resources;
·"'

this gave way to selective governmental in~ervention in the ene~gy field through

~

bureaucratic planning.

However, despite the influence of Social Democratic

Parties, planning did not include nationalization or moves in that direction,
and concentrated instead on control over societal consumption patterns as welJ
as equalization of wealth and burdens.

Both responses were somewhat politically

motivated, with ·prime ministers taking advantage of an opportunity to project
strong images through the media and assert the need for societal change in order
to ease

the passage of stronger economic legislation.

Bureaucratic factors

played a role in causing the implementation of rationing plans long after they
had been proved economically unnecessary.

In both cases, governmental action

seemed to be compartmentalized, with economic control centered in certain bureaus
or boards relatively separate from the diplomatic agencies and their foreign
governmental contacts.

Despite better access to natural gas resources, a major

pift, the EEC, OECD leverage, and the U.S. government, the Netherlands response
paralleled the Swedish remarkably closely.
Reactions to ·economic crisis may be quite similar for minor industrial
powers, especially those with traditions of wartime regulations and neutrality.
Furthermore, it seems that

as

these particular countries had grown accustomed

to. high energy prices and relatively heavy taxation, there was less governmental
worry about energy prices than about supply ,though S\\ edish Social Democracy seemed
1

to b~ing about somewhat higher priorities for price control and full-employment
than in Holland~

Despite Social Democracy and traditions of regulation, these

worries or interests led to reliance on private industries with supposedly
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superior information.

Such re.liance seems likely in future cases as long as

companies can claim special expertise or control, and unless public. suspicion·
makes continued reliance politically risky, or a stance critical of companies
more profitable.
In a sense both the Swedish and Dutch responses showed a Germanic influence.
In Germany, with its vital industrial base, energy prites were the freest and
supplies, therefore, the greatest in Europe.

While Social Demccrats in both

;

Sweden and Holland generally favored and briefly implemented assertive governmental
economic controls, many of the German concerns for industrial and fiscal stability
prevailed as well.

Therefore, regulation was largely con.fined to public con-

sumption controls, with industries left relatively free, prices allowed to rise
slowly and price 11 ceilings 11 raised in stages.

Therefore, to predict small powers'

crisis responses it may be necessary to determine the larger economic environments
within which they operate, and the constraints represented by the most powerful
economic pm'ler(s) in that environment, as well as to their own political traditions
and pro bl ems.
Elements of all three bypotheses posed earlier in the study can be seen in
these cases:

(1) planning to take advantage of national advantages {such as

relations with Shell) or conserve resouces and maintain economic activity;
(2) reliance on industry, especially in the early crisis wh~n continued oil

supplies seemed problematic and unemployment loomed--reliance bordering on 11 laissezfaire11 in the Dutch case; (3) incremental, ,disjointed, and politically opportunistic
responses, especially as better information about the extent of likely shortages
becomesavailable--including efforts to push through favored controversial

..

legJslation, election-type use of media, rationing well after it was clearly unnecessary.

It seems that the development of a crisis situation has much to do

with the response pattern.

Initially the government of a minor industrial power

in crisis is likely to defer to the priyate sector until better information is
'
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obtained.

The less irfluC!ntial thr: uovernment internationally on the issue and

the more at the mercy of cutside forces, the sooner it will· attempt to regulate
the domestic supply situation in a shortage--especially if there is a regulatory
tradition.

Later, after political pressures mount and initial

panic subsides with more information, the government will be tempted to use the
,

occasion to "redirect the society."

They may generate comprehensive plans for

energy allocation, plans which fit genuine needs to remedy dislocations, or they
may promote unnecessary plans designed to satisfy conflicting bureaucracJes
or build positive election images.
In addition to the stages of an economic crisis, minor powers' responses
will also be affected by crisis scope.The oil crisis of 1973 was only partially
one of petroleum supply; it also revolved around rliddle Eastern diplomatic and
military developments.

Although the Dutch sent emissaries to Arab states trying

to explain the Netherlands' position on the Arab-.Israel i dispute,

and actively

sought EEC diplomatic and petroleum assistance, leaders in The Hague realized
that their influence on these worldwide concerns was only :11arginal.

Therefore,

like the Swedes, they had little else to do but concentrate on the domestic and European
economic and political situation.

Hence, witness the moves to take advantage of crisis

moods to redirect the society, to implement disjointed plans from various
bureciucracies, and to use the media to project political images--in the Dutch
case actual denials that polity tow~rd Israel had changed when quite clearly it
had been changed to agree with

.

other EEC states.

If a crisis is highly

complex and carries world-wide implications even relatively influential minor
powers will be dwarfed and will probably revert to decision-making typical of
the ·third hypothesis.
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This study has sho1tm that, contrary to certain crisis 1 iterature predicting
new and improvised modes of decision-makin~, traditional patterns of businessgovernment relations and administrative practices (e.g., boards, closed
bureaucracies, planning traditions, neo-corporatism, Social Democratic priorities,
etc.} strongly affect minor powers in economic crisis.

The .crisis issue
relates
.

to these traditions, since it is 1 ikely that the government will have developed
standard means of dealing with issues such as energy before crisis emerges.

It

will use these means aspecially at the start of crisis until information about
other alternatives is pieced together.
Lindberg (1979) has noted that despite differences in political and economic
systems,a·variety of industrialized states have failed to develop and implement ~omprehensive and effective energy policies.

Sweden has perhaps done the most to

debate alternatives and issues other then supply.

But even Swedish policies have

been only sporadically successful in limiting consumption and promoting conservation.
Stringent controls, initiated during crisis, are quickly rescinded after threats
diminish.

Since efforts to redirect societies are often politically motivated,

they change with time and passing administrations. Crisis, as seen in this study,
can cause new awareness of important pro bl ems, but the continued effect of
traditional policie.s,together with the perceived impotence of minor powers in
major world crises, seem likely to impede comprehensive national planning for
l~ng-term solutions.
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